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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that, as far as Gettier cases are concerned, 
appearances are deceiving. That is, Gettier cases merely appear to be cases of epistemic 
failure (i.e., failing to know that p) but are in fact cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to 
refer to x). Gettier cases are cases of reference failure because the candidates for 
knowledge in these cases contain ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then we may 
simply be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider Gettier cases. 
This, in turn, is a good reason not to assign much, if any, evidential weight to Gettier 
intuitions (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case). 
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1. Introduction 
It is often said that “the JTB analysis was refuted by Edmund Gettier.”1 In his 
seminal paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Gettier presents 
counterexamples to the Justified True Belief (JTB) analysis of knowledge, 
according to which S knows that p if and only if p is true, S believes that p, and S 
is justified in believing that p.2 Gettier’s argument against JTB can be summed up 
as follows: 
G1. If knowledge is JTB, then S knows that p in a Gettier case. 
G2. S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case. 
Therefore, 
G3. It is not the case that knowledge is JTB. 
Premise G2 is based on what appears to be the case in Gettier cases. That is, 
in a Gettier case, it seems (at least to some) that S doesn’t know that p. Then, the 
content of this intellectual appearance, namely, <S doesn’t know that p in a 
Gettier case>, is used as a premise in an argument, like the aforementioned modus 
                                                                
1 Timothy Williamson, “Knowledge First Epistemology,” in The Routledge Companion to 
Epistemology, eds. Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (New York: Routledge, 2011), 209. 
2 Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. 
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tollens argument from premises G1 and G2 to conclusion G3, which is taken by 
many epistemologists to amount to a refutation of JTB. 
According to Weatherson, however, “maybe respecting the Gettier 
intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead have been explaining why 
we are all so easily misled by these kinds of cases.”3 This is what I aim to do in this 
paper. That is, in what follows, I will try to explain why Gettier cases are 
misleading. I will argue that, contrary to appearances, Gettier cases are actually 
cases of semantic, not epistemic, failure. This is because Gettier cases involve what 
Kripke calls “ambiguous designators.” If this is correct, then we should not respect 
Gettier intuitions. That is, there is a good reason not to assign much, if any, 
evidential weight to Gettier intuitions.4 To be clear, I will not be defending the 
JTB analysis of knowledge against Gettier and Gettier-style cases. Nor will I be 
offering a “solution” to the so-called Gettier problem. Rather, I will show why 
Gettier and Gettier-style cases are misleading. Since I think that Gettier cases are 
misleading, I don’t think we are in a position to say whether the subjects in 
Gettier cases have knowledge or not, whether the beliefs are true or not, whether 
the beliefs are justified or not, and so on. 
In what follows, then, I will explain “why we are all so easily misled by 
these kinds of cases [namely, Gettier and Gettier-style cases].”5 I will proceed by 
considering five Gettier and Gettier-style cases. The first two are Gettier’s original 
cases, namely, Case I and Case II. The third is the sheep-in-the-meadow case (due 
to Chisholm). The fourth is the Fake Barn case (due to Ginet). The fifth is the 
Stopped Clock case (due to Russell). Unlike Gettier’s original cases, the other 
Gettier-style cases are supposed to be cases in which the candidate for knowledge 
is not inferred from any falsehoods.6 I will argue that all these cases are misleading 
                                                                
3 Brian Weatherson, “What Good Are Counterexamples?” Philosophical Studies 115 (2003): 1-
31. 
4 Another challenge to the alleged evidential status of Gettier intuitions comes from 
experimental philosophy. On this debate, see the following: Jennifer Nagel, “Intuitions and 
Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 85 (2012): 495-527. Stephen Stich, “Do Different Groups Have 
Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 87 (2013): 151-178. Jennifer Nagel, “Defending the evidential value of epistemic 
intuitions: a reply to Stich,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013): 179-199. 
The main argument of this paper does not depend on experimental results concerning Gettier 
intuitions. 
5 Weatherson, “What Good,” 1. 
6 For the “no false lemmas” response to Gettier cases, see David M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and 
Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 152 and Michael Clark, “Knowledge 
and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s paper,” Analysis 24 (1963): 46-48. See also Robert K. 
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insofar as they merely appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know 
that p), when in fact they are cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). 
Gettier cases are cases of reference failure because the candidates for knowledge in 
these cases contain ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then we may simply 
be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider Gettier cases. 
This, in turn, is a good reason not to assign much, if any, evidential weight to 
Gettier intuitions (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case). 
2. Gettier’s Original Cases 
In Gettier’s first case, the candidate for knowledge, which Smith infers from 
“Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket,”7 is 
the following proposition: 
(I) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
Since Smith gets the job and has ten coins in his pocket, (I) is true. Smith 
believes (I) and is justified in believing (I), insofar as he has some evidence for (I), 
so all the conditions of the JTB analysis of knowledge are supposedly met. But 
Smith does not know that (I) is true, or so it seems to many philosophers and non-
philosophers.8 
This case is misleading, however, because it merely appears to be a case of 
epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p) but is in fact a case of semantic 
failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). To see why, notice that, when Smith believes 
that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket,9 the “coins” that 
Smith wishes to talk about are not the coins that are actually in his pocket. In 
other words, ‘coins’ in Gettier’s Case I is what Kripke calls an “ambiguous 
designator.”10 
                                                                                                                                       
Shope, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), 24 and the Appendix in John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 
(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986). Cf. Michael Levin, “Gettier Cases Without False 
Lemmas,” Erkenntnis 64 (2006): 381-392. 
7 Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief,” 122. 
8 For a recent study on Gettier intuitions among non-philosophers, see Edouard Machery, et al, 
“Gettier across cultures,” Noûs. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12110. 
9 Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief,” 122. 
10 Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 
(1977): 255-276. 
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Along the lines of Grice’s distinction between what a speaker’s words mean 
and what the speaker means in saying these words,11 Kripke draws a distinction 
between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. To illustrate the distinction, 
Kripke gives the following example: 
Two people see Smith in the distance and mistake him for Jones. They have a 
brief colloquy: “What is Jones doing?” “Raking the leaves.” “Jones,” in the 
common language of both, is a name of Jones; it never names Smith. Yet, in some 
sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have referred to 
Smith, and the second participant has said something true about the man he 
referred to if and only if Smith was raking the leaves (whether or not Jones 
was).12 
According to Kripke, then, “the speaker’s referent of a designator [is] that 
object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes 
fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.”13 In 
Kripke’s example, the speaker’s referent of ‘Jones’ is Smith, whereas the semantic 
referent of ‘Jones’ is Jones. In Gettier’s Case I, the speaker’s referent of ‘coins’ is 
the ten coins that are in Jones’ pocket, whereas the semantic referent of ‘coins’ is 
the ten coins that are in Smith’s pocket. For this reason, ‘coins’ is an ambiguous 
designator in Gettier’s Case I.14 
If this is correct, then it is not clear that, by using ‘coins’, Smith manages to 
successfully refer to the ten coins that fulfill the conditions for being the semantic 
referent of ‘coins’, i.e., the ten coins that make (I) true. After all, Smith wishes to 
talk about the ten coins that are in Jones’ pocket. But the ten coins that are in 
Jones’ pocket do not fulfill the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘coins’ 
in Case I, i.e., the referent of ‘coins’ that makes (I) true, since the “coins” that 
Smith wishes to talk about are not the coins that are in the pocket of the man who 
will get the job. If this is correct, then Gettier’s Case I is a case of reference failure, 
which is a semantic failure, not an epistemic failure, and hence not knowledge 
failure.15 
                                                                
11 H. P. Grice, “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions,” The Philosophical Review 78 (1969): 147-
177. 
12 Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference,” 263. 
13 Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference,” 264. 
14 In Gettier’s Case I, ‘the man’ is an ambiguous designator as well. Cf. Christoph Schmidt-Petri, 
“Is Gettier’s First Example Flawed?” Knowledge and Belief, eds. W. Löffler and P. Weingartner 
(ALWS, 2003), 317-319. 
15 Cf. Adrian Heathcote, “Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem,” in Aspects of Knowing: 
Epistemological Essays, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), 151-168 on a 
different sort of semantic ambiguity in Case I. Unlike Heathcote, I am not trying to offer a 
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What makes Gettier’s Case I misleading, then, is the presence of the 
ambiguous designator ‘coins.’ Given that ‘coins’ is an ambiguous designator, it is 
not clear that, by using ‘coins,’ Smith manages to successfully refer to what fulfills 
the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘coins,’ which is different from 
what Smith wishes to talk about. This means that, upon considering Gettier’s Case 
I, we may be confusing the fact that Smith fails to refer to what actually fulfills the 
conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘coins,’ which is a semantic fact 
about the case, with an epistemic fact, namely, that Smith doesn’t know that (I) is 
the case. 
In Gettier’s second case, the candidate for knowledge, which Smith infers 
from “(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston,”16 is the following 
proposition: 
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. 
Since the second disjunct of (h) happens to be true, (h) is true. Smith 
believes (h) and is justified in believing (h), insofar as he has some evidence for “(f) 
Jones owns a Ford,” from which Smith gets (g) and then infers (h), so all the 
conditions of the JTB analysis of knowledge are supposedly met. But Smith does 
not know that (h) is true, or so it seems to many philosophers and non-
philosophers. 
It is important to note that, unlike Case I, Case II involves two inferences. 
The first inference is from 
(f) Jones owns a Ford. 
to 
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston. 
The second inference is from (g) to 
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. 
Smith’s evidence for (f) is that “Jones has at all times in the past within 
Smith’s memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered 
Smith a ride while driving a Ford.”17 In using ‘Jones,’ then, Smith wishes to talk 
about the person who offered Smith a ride, has always owned a Ford, etc. But the 
person who offered Smith a ride, has always owned a Ford, etc. does not fulfill the 
                                                                                                                                       
“solution” to the so-called Gettier problem, since I think the cases are misleading, as I try to 
show in this paper. 
16 Gettier, “Is justified true belief,” 122. 
17 Gettier, “Is justified true belief,” 122. 
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conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘Jones’ in Case II, i.e., the referent of 
‘Jones’ that makes (g) true, since, by stipulation the person that Smith wishes to 
talk about by using ‘Jones’ does not own a Ford. In Gettier’s Case II, then, the 
speaker’s referent of ‘Jones’ is the person who offered Smith a ride, has always 
owned a Ford, etc., whereas the semantic referent of ‘Jones,’ i.e., the referent of 
‘Jones’ that makes (g) true, cannot be that person, since Jones does not own a Ford, 
by stipulation. For this reason, ‘Jones’ is an ambiguous designator in Gettier’s Case 
II. If this is correct, then, like Case I, Case II is a case of reference failure, which is 
a semantic failure, not an epistemic failure, and hence not knowledge failure. 
What makes Gettier’s second case misleading, then, is the presence of the 
ambiguous designator ‘Jones.’ Given that ‘Jones’ is an ambiguous designator, it is 
not clear that, by using ‘Jones,’ Smith manages to successfully refer to what fulfills 
the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘Jones,’ which is different from 
what Smith wishes to talk about. This means that, upon considering Gettier’s 
second case, we may be confusing the fact that Smith fails to refer to what actually 
fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘Jones,’ which is a 
semantic fact about the case, with an epistemic fact, namely, that Smith doesn’t 
know that (h) is the case. 
3. The Sheep-in-the-Meadow Case 
The sheep-in-the-meadow case18 is supposed to be a Gettier-style case without 
false lemmas (i.e., without inferences from falsehoods):19 
It’s a bright sunny day; I’m out in the country; and it looks to me like there’s a 
sheep in a certain meadow. […] So I believe that there’s a sheep in the meadow. 
And let’s suppose that there is a sheep in the meadow, so that my belief is true. 
[…] So I have a justified true belief that there’s a sheep in the meadow. Do I 
know that there’s a sheep in the meadow?20 
                                                                
18 Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966). 
19 An earlier so-called Gettier-style case without false lemmas can be found in Gilbert Harman, 
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press Harman, 1973), 75. Cf. William G. Lycan, 
“On the Gettier Problem Problem,” in Epistemology Futures, ed. S. Hetherington (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 148-168. Lycan defends JTB with the addition of the “no false 
lemmas” condition. Another epistemologist who defends the tripartite analysis of knowledge is 
Stephen Hetherington, Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Cf. Anthony R. Booth, “The Gettier Illusion, the 
Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 625-638. 
20 Jay F. Rosenberg, Three Conversations about Knowing (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
2000), 30. 
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Since there is a rock that looks like a sheep in the meadow, and there is an 
actual sheep behind the rock that looks like a sheep, it seems that the subject S in 
the sheep-in-the-meadow case does not know that there’s a sheep in the meadow 
because S’s belief that there’s a sheep in the meadow is accidentally true or true as 
a matter of epistemic luck.21 
However, I think that the sheep-in-the-meadow case is misleading in much 
the same way that Gettier’s original cases are misleading. Like ‘coins’ in Case I, 
and ‘Jones’ in Case II, ‘sheep’ is an ambiguous designator in the sheep-in-the-
meadow case. In terms of semantic reference, ‘sheep’ designates the actual sheep 
that makes <there’s a sheep in the meadow> true. In terms of speaker’s reference, 
‘sheep’ designates what S wishes to talk about, which is a rock that to S looks like a 
sheep, not the actual sheep that makes <there’s a sheep in the meadow> true. If 
this is correct, then it is not clear that, by using ‘sheep’, S manages to successfully 
refer to the sheep that makes <there’s a sheep in the meadow> true. After all, S 
wishes to talk about the “sheep” that S sees. But the “sheep” that S sees does not 
fulfill the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘sheep,’ i.e., the referent of 
‘sheep’ that makes <there’s a sheep in the meadow> true, given that it is a rock 
that to S looks like a sheep. If this is correct, then the sheep-in-the-meadow case is 
a case of reference failure, which is a semantic failure, not an epistemic failure, 
and hence not knowledge failure. 
What makes the sheep-in-the-meadow case misleading, then, is the 
presence of the ambiguous designator ‘sheep’. Given that ‘sheep’ is an ambiguous 
designator, it is not clear that, by using ‘sheep’, S manages to successfully refer to 
what fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘sheep’, which is 
different from what S wishes to talk about. This means that, upon considering the 
sheep-in-the-meadow case, we may be confusing the fact that S fails to refer to 
what actually fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘sheep’, 
which is a semantic fact about the case, with an epistemic fact, namely, that S 
doesn’t know that there’s a sheep in the meadow. 
4. The Fake Barn Case 
The same diagnosis, I submit, applies to other so-called Gettier-style cases without 
false lemmas. Consider Goldman’s22 Fake Barn case (due to Carl Ginet):23 
                                                                
21 Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 145-177. 
22 Alvin I. Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy 73 
(1976): 771-791. 
23 Cf. Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 114. 
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Henry is driving in the countryside and sees a barn ahead in clear view. On this 
basis he believes that the object he sees is a barn. Unknown to Henry, however, 
the area is dotted with barn facades that are indistinguishable from real barn 
from the road. However, Henry happens to be looking at the one real barn in the 
area.24 
In the Fake Barn case, it seems that the JTB conditions are all met. 
Moreover, Henry’s belief that there is a barn over there is not inferred from any 
falsehoods, and yet Henry does not know that there is a barn over there, or so it 
seems. 
But the Fake Barn case is misleading as well. Like ‘coins’ in Case I, ‘Jones’ in 
Case II, and ‘sheep’ in the sheep-in-the-meadow case, ‘barn’ is an ambiguous 
designator in the Fake Barn case. In terms of semantic reference, ‘barn’ designates 
the one real barn in Barn County that makes <there’s a barn over there> true. In 
terms of speaker’s reference, ‘barn’ designates what S wishes to talk about. In that 
case, however, it is not clear that, by using ‘barn’, S manages to successfully refer 
to the one real barn that makes <there’s a barn over there> true. After all, S could 
have easily referred to a mere barn-façade by using ‘barn’, since Barn County is 
peppered with barn-façades. In terms of speaker’s reference, then, ‘barn’ refers to 
what to S looks like a barn, which could have easily been a barn façade, not the 
one real barn that makes <there’s a barn over there> true.25 If this is correct, then, 
like Gettier’s Case I and the sheep-in-the-meadow case, the Fake Barn case is a 
case of reference failure, which is a semantic failure, not an epistemic failure, and 
hence not knowledge failure. 
What makes the Fake Barn case misleading, then, is the presence of the 
ambiguous designator ‘barn’. Given that ‘barn’ is an ambiguous designator, it is not 
clear that, by using ‘barn’, S manages to successfully refer to what fulfills the 
conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘barn’, which is different from what 
S wishes to talk about. This means that, upon considering the Fake Barn case, we 
may be confusing the fact that S fails to refer to what actually fulfills the 
conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘barn’, which is a semantic fact about 
the case, with an epistemic fact, namely, that S doesn’t know that there’s a barn 
over there. 
                                                                
24 John Greco, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 76. 
25 For more on accidentality in Gettier-style cases, see Masahiro Yamada, “Getting it Right by 
Accident,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2011): 72-105 and Karl Schafer, 
“Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 89 (2014): 373-393. 
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5. The Stopped Clock Case 
Some might think that, in Russell’s Stopped Clock case,26 there are no ambiguous 
designators. In the Stopped Clock case the candidate for knowledge is, say, that 
the time is five o’clock. Since the clock stopped exactly twelve hours ago, and the 
time is in fact five o’clock, S doesn’t know that the time is five o’clock, or so it 
might seem to many.27 
Like the Gettier and Gettier-style cases discussed so far, however, I think 
that the Stopped Clock case also involves an ambiguous designator. To see why, 
note that, like ‘sheep’ in the sheep-in-the-meadow case, ‘barn’ in the Fake Barn 
case, ‘coins’ in Case I, and ‘Jones’ in Case II, ‘the time’ is an ambiguous designator 
in the Stopped Clock case. In terms of semantic reference, ‘the time’ designates the 
standard time in the time zone where it is currently five o’clock. In terms of 
speaker’s reference, ‘the time’ designates what S wishes to talk about, which is a 
reading from the stopped clock. In that case, however, it is not clear that, by using 
‘the time’, S manages to successfully refer to the standard time in the time zone 
where it is currently five o’clock, since S uses ‘the time’ to talk about something 
(namely, a reading from a stopped clock) that does not in fact fulfill the conditions 
for being the semantic referent of ‘the time’, given that the clock is not working 
properly.28 After all, a clock is an instrument that indicates local time in a given 
time zone. Since the time indicator in the Stopped Clock case is a faulty one by 
stipulation, any given reading from this faulty time indicator does not fulfill the 
conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘the time’.29 If this is correct, then, 
like Gettier’s Cases I and II, the sheep-in-the-meadow case, and the Fake Barn 
                                                                
26 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Its Limits (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1948), 170-171. 
27 The Stopped Clock case rests on the assumption that a stopped clock shows the right time 
twice a day. For present purposes, I will not challenge this assumption although some do. See, 
e.g., Adrian Heathcote, “Truthmaking, Evidence of, and Impossibility Proofs,” Acta Analytica 29 
(2014): 363-375. 
28 Cf. Shope, The Analysis of Knowing, 20. 
29 Adrian Heathcote, “Gettier and the Stopped Clock,” Analysis 72 (2012): 309-314 offers an 
explanation in terms of truthmakers for why S does not know that p (e.g., that the time is five 
o’clock) in Russell’s Stopped Clock case. I remain noncommittal about whether S knows that p 
or not in the Stopped Clock case precisely because I think it is misleading. If I am right, then the 
Stopped Clock case is misleading in the same way that other Gettier and Gettier-style cases are 
misleading. That is, it merely appears to be a case of knowledge failure when in fact it is a case 
of reference failure. Since reference failure is a semantic, not an epistemic, failure, the Gettier 
intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case should not be respected. 
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case, the Stopped Clock case is a case of reference failure, which is a semantic 
failure, not an epistemic failure, and hence not knowledge failure. 
What makes the Stopped Clock case misleading, then, is the presence of the 
ambiguous designator ‘the time’. Given that ‘the time’ is an ambiguous designator, 
it is not clear that, by using ‘the time’, S manages to successfully refer to what 
fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘the time’, which is 
different from what S wishes to talk about. This means that, upon considering the 
Stopped Clock case, we may be confusing the fact that S fails to refer to what 
actually fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘the time’, which 
is a semantic fact about the case, with an epistemic fact, namely, that S doesn’t 
know that the time is five o’clock. 
6. Semantic Failure vs. Epistemic Failure 
I have argued that Gettier and Gettier-style (without false lemmas) cases merely 
appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p) but are in fact 
cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). This is because Gettier cases 
involve what Kripke calls “ambiguous designators.” But failing to refer is a 
semantic failure, not an epistemic failure, like failing to know that p. 
To illustrate the difference between semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to 
x) and epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p), suppose I believe that this 
table is made of matter. By ‘matter’, however, I do not mean atoms that are made 
of subatomic particles. Rather, I use ‘matter’ to talk about green cheese. And I 
believe that everything in the universe, including this table, is made of green 
cheese. In that case, when I believe that this table is made of matter, I actually 
believe that this table is made of green cheese, since I use ‘matter’ to refer to green 
cheese. If I were to use ‘matter’ to refer to what fulfills the conditions for being 
the semantic referent of ‘matter’, i.e., if I were to use ‘matter’ to refer to atoms, 
then perhaps I would know that this table is made of matter. But I use ‘matter’ to 
refer to green cheese, not atoms, and so my failure is semantic (i.e., failing to refer 
to what fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘matter’), not 
epistemic (i.e., failing to know that this table is made of matter). 
Similarly, if Smith were to use ‘coins’ to refer to the ten coins that make (I) 
true, i.e., the ten coins in his pocket, then perhaps Smith would know that the 
man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. But Smith uses ‘coins’ to 
refer to the coins in Jones’ pocket, not the coins in his pocket, and so his failure is 
semantic (i.e., a failure to refer to what fulfills the conditions for being the 
semantic referent of ‘coins’), not epistemic (i.e., a failure to know that the man 
who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket). 
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If Smith were to use ‘Jones’ to refer to the person that make (g) true, i.e., the 
person who owns a Ford, then perhaps Smith would know that Jones owns a Ford 
or Brown is in Barcelona. But Smith uses ‘Jones’ to refer to the person who offered 
Smith a ride, has always owned a Ford, etc., who doesn’t own a Ford (by 
stipulation), and so Smith’s failure is semantic (i.e., a failure to refer to what fulfills 
the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘Jones’), not epistemic (i.e., a 
failure to know that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona). 
If S were to use ‘sheep’ to refer to the actual sheep that makes <there’s a 
sheep in the meadow> true, then perhaps S would know that there’s a sheep in the 
meadow. But S uses ‘sheep’ to refer to something that does not fulfill the semantic 
conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘sheep’ (namely, a rock that looks 
like a sheep to S), and so S’s failure is semantic (i.e., a failure to refer to what 
fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘sheep’), not epistemic 
(i.e., a failure to know that there’s a sheep in the meadow). 
If S were to use ‘barn’ to refer to the one real barn that makes <there’s a 
barn over there> true, then perhaps S would know that there’s a barn over there. 
But S uses ‘barn’ to refer to something that could have easily failed to fulfill the 
semantic conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘barn’ (namely, a mere 
barn-façade, given that Barn County is peppered with barn-façades), and so, if S 
fails, S’s failure is semantic (i.e., a failure to refer to what fulfills the conditions for 
being the semantic referent of ‘barn’), not epistemic (i.e., a failure to know that 
there’s a barn over there). 
Finally, if S were to use ‘the time’ to refer the standard time in the time 
zone where it is currently five o’clock, then perhaps S would know that the time is 
five o’clock. But S uses ‘the time’ to refer to something that does not fulfill the 
semantic conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘the time’ (namely, a 
reading from a broken time indicator), and so S’s failure is semantic (i.e., a failure 
to refer to what fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of ‘the 
time’), not epistemic (i.e., a failure to know that the time is five o’clock). 
If this is correct, then Gettier cases are misleading because they merely 
appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p), when in fact 
they are cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer). Gettier cases are cases of 
reference failure because the candidates for knowledge in these cases contain 
ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then we may simply be mistaking 
semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider Gettier cases. This, in turn, is 
a good reason not to assign much, if any, evidential weight to Gettier intuitions 
(i.e., that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case). That is, there is a good reason to 
think that Gettier cases are misleading in a way that makes us mistake semantic 
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facts for epistemic facts. If this is correct, then we should not assign much, if any, 
evidential weight to Gettier intuitions. 
7. Objections and Replies 
I have argued that Gettier cases are misleading because the candidates for 
knowledge in these cases contain ambiguous designators. In this section, I will 
consider a couple of objections to my overall argument. The first objection goes 
like this. In evaluating Gettier cases, we are concerned with beliefs, not their 
verbal expressions, and so the notion of reference (either speaker’s reference or 
semantic reference) does not apply to evaluating such cases. 
In reply, I grant that it is not necessary that subjects make any claims or 
express their thoughts as far as the evaluation of Gettier cases is concerned. 
However, I think that the notion of reference is still relevant. After all, knowledge 
itself is supposed by many to either entail a mental state (such as belief) or be a 
mental state. According to Williamson, for instance, “knowing is the most general 
factive stative attitude” and the “characteristic expression of a factive stative 
attitude in language is a factive mental state operator (FMSO).”30 For this reason, 
whether we think of subjects in Gettier cases as making claims or as having 
thoughts, which are supposed to express propositions, those propositions are 
supposed to be about something (e.g., coins, sheep, barns, etc.), which is why the 
notion of reference is relevant here.31 
The second objection goes like this. Even if the candidates for knowledge in 
Gettier cases contain ambiguous designators, the epistemic facts about those cases 
are still clear. For example, in the sheep-in-the-meadow case, it is clear that S 
believes that there’s a sheep in the meadow but doesn’t know that there’s a sheep 
in the meadow. 
In reply, I would say that this is a little too quick and simple. For, if the 
candidates for knowledge in Gettier cases contain ambiguous designators, as I have 
argued, then that means that the relevant beliefs are ambiguous between two 
                                                                
30 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
34. See also Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, “Knowledge Ascriptions: Their Semantics, 
Cognitive Bases, and Social Functions,” in Knowledge Ascriptions, eds. Jessica Brown and 
Mikkel Gerken (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1-30. 
31 Some readers may wish to invoke the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) here. 
According to LOTH, “thought and thinking are done in a mental language, i.e., in a symbolic 
system physically realized in the brain of the relevant organisms” (Murat Aydede, “The 
Language of Thought Hypothesis,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Fall 2015 Edition) URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/language-
thought). Of course, a symbol is supposed to stand for (or refer to) something. 
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interpretations: an “objective” interpretation in terms of the conditions that make 
the belief true (i.e., in terms of semantic reference or what a speaker’s words 
mean) and a “subjective” interpretation in terms of what S means (i.e., in terms of 
speaker’s reference or what a speaker means in uttering certain words). In the 
sheep-in-the-meadow case, for example, the belief that there’s a sheep in the 
meadow is ambiguous between these two interpretations: 
Objective interpretation (semantic reference): the semantic referent of ‘sheep’ in 
<there’s a sheep in the meadow> is the actual sheep that makes <there’s a sheep 
in the meadow> true; otherwise, <there’s a sheep in the meadow> would not be 
true. 
Subjective interpretation (speaker’s reference): the speaker’s referent of ‘sheep’ in 
<there’s a sheep in the meadow> is what S sees, which is the rock that looks like 
a sheep, not what S doesn’t see, which is the actual sheep that makes <there’s a 
sheep in the meadow> true. 
As I have argued above, interpreted “objectively,” or in terms of what the 
words mean, <there’s a sheep in the meadow> is not what S actually believes, 
since S uses ‘sheep’ to talk about what S sees, not what S doesn’t see. Interpreted 
“subjectively,” or in terms of what S means by uttering these words, <there’s a 
sheep in the meadow> is strictly false, since S uses ‘sheep’ to talk about something 
that does not in fact fulfill the conditions for being the semantic referent of 
‘sheep.’ 
We can see this ambiguity in Kripke’s case as well. It might seem as if the 
epistemic facts of Kripke’s case are clear: the two people believe that Jones is 
raking the leaves but they don’t know that Jones is raking the leaves. However, I 
submit that the epistemic facts of the case are not as clear as they might seem 
precisely because ‘Jones’ is an ambiguous designator in this case. The people who 
mistake Smith for Jones wish to talk about Jones, and so they use ‘Jones’. Their 
belief that Jones is raking the leaves is thus ambiguous between two 
interpretations: 
1. Semantic reference: Jones (= Smith) is raking the leaves. 
2. Speaker’s reference: Jones (= Jones) is raking the leaves. 
By stipulation, (2) is false, since the people in the case mistake Smith for 
Jones and Jones is not in fact raking the leaves. On (2), then, the two people in 
Kripke’s case simply have a false belief. On the other hand, (1) is not actually what 
the people in the case believe, since they wish to talk about Jones and they use 
‘Jones’ to talk about what they see, which is Smith raking the leaves. To put it 
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crudely, on (1), what goes on in their heads does not match the facts of the case. 
Given this ambiguity, then, the case, like Gettier cases in general, is misleading. 
8. Conclusion 
My aim in this paper has been to remove “some of the rubbish that lies in the way 
to knowledge.”32 The “rubbish” I seek to remove is so-called Gettier intuitions 
elicited from Gettier cases. I have argued that Gettier cases are misleading insofar 
as they merely appear to be cases of epistemic failure (i.e., failing to know that p) 
but are in fact cases of semantic failure (i.e., failing to refer to x). Gettier cases are 
cases of reference failure because the candidates for knowledge in these cases 
contain ambiguous designators. If this is correct, then, because of this ambiguity, 
we may simply be mistaking semantic facts for epistemic facts when we consider 
Gettier cases. This, in turn, is a good reason not to assign much, if any, evidential 
weight to Gettier intuitions (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case). 
                                                                
32 John Locke, “Epistle to the Reader,” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London, 
1689). 
